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Introduction

F

and concern for Christian
jurists than the problem of the fair ordinance of religious liberty
within each political community and in the international sphere. The
teaching of the integral values of the common good on all levels of
society, and the need for a very deep and profound respect for the
conscience of the individual are factors which converge in this problem
of religious liberty.
To my credit and pleasure, I have been entrusted with introducing
the analysis of one of the most attractive and complex aspects of that
vast subject. In effect, it deals with reflecting seriously on the reciprocal
implications between the "natural right of religious liberty" of each
human being and the rights of parents in the education of their children.
These words suffice for an understanding of the depth and direction
of the problem. Given the limited amount of time at our disposal, it is
obvious that we cannot attempt to treat our subject in a systematic
manner or in all of its ramifications. On the other hand, our task is
better understood as directed toward the encouragement of collective
thinking on this question so rich in nuances, and in recapping the
thoughts of all the members of the Congress. Thus the minutes of this
great assembly will contain the widest possible information concerning
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the approaches and solutions to the problems that presently manifest themselves in
the various countries here represented.
With merited regard for the personal reflections of the illustrious jurists here assembled, and the countless others who are
spiritually united with us from afar, I dare
to point out some simple reflections. It is
my hope that we shall thus find and put
into effect adequate juridic formulae which
guarantee, at the same time, respect for a
true freedom of conscience and the cultivation of the fundamental values of the spirit.
To more deeply approach the subject
under consideration, and in order to properly delineate its complexities and difficulties, it is important to emphasize the three
sets of significant factors that enter into
play.
1) The dimension of religiosity in human life, in all its aspects; from the most
intimate-those that invade the sanctuary
of the conscience-to the most external,
e.g., the public manifestations of the cult.
This area of the relation of man to God
cannot remain outside a fully human formation of the individual, if one does not
want to mutilate man in regard to what is
most profound and significant in his life.
It does not deal, in fact, with preserving
an "historical religiosity," which the role of
science and technology can eliminate. It
deals, on the contrary, with cultivating an
essential dimension which will have meaning in the present, and which will help to
forge the future. As Jacques Maritain has
accurately observed: "The education of tomorrow will have to put an end to the
separation between religious inspiration
and the secular activities of man, just as
integral humanism must encompass among
its principal roots the sanctification of profane and temporal being." More recently,
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from the Cathedral of St. Peter, Pope Paul
VI has emphasized the same exigency:
Modern progress places more emphasis on
spiritual goods. This is because progress itself needs good souls, strong men, well educated spirits, whole and intelligent men.
And it is precisely Christian education that
forms man in his totality and leads him to
the conquest of supreme values, thus enabling him to properly enjoy the goods of
this world as well.
As our historical experience amply demonstrates, in any attempt to formulate juridic
norms for the regulation of the educative
system of a particular society, we are obviously presented with a contrast of opposing considerations. That is, the norms we
seek must at one time respect the freedom
of the conscience of each citizen, and also
the integrity of an education that fosters
the highest spiritual values-at its peak,
the value of Christian religiosity. He who
refuses to retreat into the two extreme and
inadequate positions of either secular and
pseudo-liberal agnosticism, on the one
hand, or ideological servitude to secular
totalitarianism, on the other, will always
feel an extreme anxiety in his soul. This is
caused by the desire to achieve a beautiful
harmony of personal liberty with service
to objective truth. During this life, such a
perfect harmony is never completely realized and, therefore, a constant tension results-but it is precisely this tension that
gives immense drama to human existence.
2) From another perspective we must
consider the essential role of the educative
and directive authority within the family
group. For as much as we insist-and I
insist to the utmost-on the importance
and necessity of the family having an everincreasing communal and informal structure (and that the relationship between the
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parents and the children be articulated in
a heart to heart dialogue, with the language
of love and understanding, over and above
a hierarchical system of severity), it is impossible to eliminate, since it is in the
nature of things, the illuminatory and corrective mission that parents share with respect to their children.
But all this is complicated by another
dimension of the problem which is equally
natural and undeniable: that of the dignity
of the child, and the duty of respect for his
conscience and for his sacred right to the
free search for truth. If, in the first years
of his life, these factors are embryonic,
they must nevertheless be recognized. As
the child grows, the tensions and struggles
between these two fundamental attitudes
(that of the parents, who try to conform
the child to their deepest beliefs, and that
of the child who reaffirms, as a human
being, his right to the exercise of responsible liberty) become more apparent.
The jurists and, above all, the legislators,
have to approach the mystery of the paternal-filial relationship with great delicacy
and respect. However, they can not close
their eyes to the often ignored fact of a
break in the communications and peace of
the family.
3) There is still more to be considered
in this area. It is the problem of the equality of the father and the mother concerning
the exercise of family authority and, above
all, regarding the educative function. In
absolute matriarchal or patriarchal systems, the question would have no more
than an historic importance. However, in
our society it acquires an immediate urgency. The equality of rights and duties of
both the husband and wife concerning the
conduct of the home and, above all, in the
formation of the personality of the chil-

dren, is increasingly apparent in the social
realities of our day and the juridic norms
that reflect them.
No one with a truly realistic and human approach would dare to deny the
mother an extremely important role in the
molding of the child, especially in that
which concerns religious education. In fact,
in the immense majority of homes, the
mothers are the ones who bring to life the
faith and the love of God in the souls of
their children. But precisely for that reason it is not possible to ignore (and jurists
throughout the world have painful experience of it) the problems that exist concerning the role of the father and the mother
with respect to the moral and religious
education of their descendants. The tensions between the disbelieving father and
the pious mother, and, in rarer cases, the
unbelieving mother and the deeply religious
father or (that which is particularly important to the ecumenical climate in which
we live) the father of one religious confession and the mother of another, raise
difficulties in the face of which neither the
Church nor the State can remain indifferent. However, their intervention must be
realized in a manner that will sacrifice
neither the well-being of the child, nor a
respect for his conscience. Furthermore,
the educative function of the parents must
be equally respected, and attention must
be given to the essential unity of the family. At first sight, the problem would seem
to require something like a "squaring of
the circle."
It has seemed indispensable to us to
point out the multiple and complex factors
concerning the problem we are analyzing,
in order to acquire a suitable understanding of its magnitude and difficulty, not with
the temptations of sceptic indifferentism,
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but rather with a deeply human desire of
contributing, according to our vocation as
jurists, to the finding of the most humane
solutions to the problem. A scientifically
methodic reflection on the problem would
oblige us, consequently, to examine in detail each one of these aspects. But, since
that is not now possible, nor even strictly
necessary, considering the ideological
homogeneity of those attending this assembly, we will content ourselves with the
enumeration and consideration of three
basic precepts.
First, the natural, inalienable and inviolable right of each human being, regardless of sex, age, or social position, to a just
religious liberty, i.e., according to the beautiful words of His Holiness John XXIII:
"to honor God according to the dictum of
his proper conscience and to profess his
religion privately and publicly."
Secondly, the equally undeniable role of
the parents, which is at once a right and
a duty, in the education of their children
according to their own beliefs and ideals,
on all levels, from scientific and professional training to the highest moral and
religious values. (For the moment we
leave in parenthesis the difficult question
of whether this right and duty of parents
reaches the extreme of "excluding the dimension of religiosity" in the formation of
their children when they, the parents, are
formally agnostics or militant atheists.)
Thirdly, the co-ordinative and even
perfective function of the State (in the
light of the principle of subsidiarity), in
the sense not only of making compatible
coexisting or contrasting liberties (e.g., the
exercise of religious liberty and the educative mission of parents), but also in the
blending and integration of these subjective attitudes within the service of the
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common good. But it is most important to
emphasize that the concept of the "common good" cannot be understood as synonymous with the good of the State, as
something heterogeneous and superior to
the personal good of each citizen. It is, in
the language of John XXIII concerning
the treatise of Pius XII, the conjunct of
social conditions that make possible, precisely to each and every man, the most
facile and intense affirmation of his personality.
Having brought to light these basic difficulties, we shall concentrate our analysis
on the great problems which we previously
pointed out. We will handle these difficulties on a sociological and moral plane, as
well as in regard to the juridic concepts
either articulated in the existing positive
law, on a national or international scale,
or still in fieri under the impulse of the
exigencies of natural law. Above all, we
will consider these problems in relation to
a Christian juridic understanding at the
level of the present historical situation of
the world.
We shall proceed from the most external or tangential perspective-that is to
say, the existing tensions between the domestic community and the State-to the
most intimate perspective, that is, the possible tensions within the family itself. Thus,
we will first consider the contrasts and
conflicts between the educative activity of
the parents and the juridico-political function of the State. In order to illuminate the
problem as much as possible, we will enter
into a very short examination of the tensions between the spouses with respect to
the education of their children, as much
in situations which we could term "normal"
living, as in circumstances of discord.
Finally, we shall reflect on the harmony
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and discord that exists between parents
and their offspring regarding their religious
formation.
Tensions Between the Educative
Mission of the Parents and the
Juridico-Political Function of the State
It is a fact of history that situations of
tension and conflict between the family and
the State concerning the education of new
generations have occurred many times and,
in fact, are still occurring. The factors
which concur in creating these situations
are of very diverse nature, but their ultimate root lies in the distinct and opposing
ideological concepts of the world and of
life.
It is not necessary to describe here the
two, well known, extreme "statist" attitudes which, while derived from antagonistic philosophical roots, are nevertheless
coincident in their understanding of the
educative problem (a fact which at first
sight would appear to be a paradox). The
old liberal, or better, pseudo-liberal concept reached its peak in the latter half of
the nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth century. Relying on
an affirmation of respect for the conscience
of the child, and other similar declarations,
(e.g., the necessity of eliminating all "supra-scientific" elements from the formation
of the young and of giving the most
homogeneous "secular" education possible
to all the citizens in a single system of
state-operated schools), this tradition generated very painful attacks, not only on
the necessity for an integral education of
the entire human being, but also against
the natural right and duty of parents to
care for the spiritual formation of their
children.

As Christian jurists, that is to say, as
men dedicated to the idea of justice as a
vocation, we have to recognize that some
of the preoccupations of the "old liberals"
ought to be examined calmly and incorporated into a fully human scheme of education. I refer principally to the guarantee
that all parents should always be able to
find within the educative system of their
country institutions which impart to their
children moral and religious teachings in
agreement with their beliefs, whatever they
may be, limited of course by a respect for
the values of morality and of public order.
It is also undeniably important, especially
in the primary and intermediate grades,
that these schools, whether public or private, have as students children and young
people from the various regions, races and
social levels of the nation, so that it will be
possible to achieve, from childhood, a
better climate of understanding and of
dialogue. This is imperative in any really
human society, and is especially important
in a society which pretends to nourish itself on Christian ideals.
But these aspirations and others like
them must be achieved through a juridic
ordinance which does not rely on the already anachronistic "secular liberalism,"
in which are found many of the totalitarian
deviations of the past. Through the years,
the supreme Magisterium of the Church
has frequently confronted and condemned
"secularism" in this area. Recall the censures of Pius IX's Syllabus or those of Leo
XIII concerning "secular" education, as
proclaimed by "liberal" Masonry, and later those of Pius XI, with regard to analogous problems in Mexico and in Spain.
Similar and still more serious secular
interventions have occurred under the
regimes of collectivist or totalitarian in-
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spiration, whatever their ideological base
(e.g., monopoly of nationality, race or social class), and regardless of the historic
forms in which they have been crystallizing
during the last century. It is also a painful
fact that the juridic ordination of education
within these political situations (call them
German Nationalism, Italian Fascism, Soviet Communism) radically violates the
natural mission of the parents with respect
to the formation of their children. Consequently, these abuses have been severely
condemned from the Cathedral of St. Peter.
Leo XIII, in 1878, denounced the errors
of Marxist Socialism on this point. Decades later, Pius XI did the same with regard to German National Socialism and
Fascism. Pius XII repeated these protests
against any educative system of totalitarian
form.
From the depths of these false opinions
rises the Christian concept which, while
recognizing the respective functions of the
Church and also of the State (although on
different levels) in the education of the
youth, clearly points out the role of the
family and the rights and duties of the
parents. It is neither possible nor necessary to systematically develop that doctrine here. It is well known to all the members of this Congress, and has always been
unequivocally announced by the Pontifical
Magisterium, especially since the second
half of the past century.
The point of departure is the Gospel
precept of carrying the light of the faith to
all the peoples; Docete omnes gentes. In
still more concrete form, it is St. Thomas
Aquinas' idea that if God participates universally in reason from the beginning, the
father participates according to a singular
mode and is immediately responsible for
the "generation, the education and the
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teaching and even that which refers to the
perfection of the human life." Therefore,
it would be against natural justice if the
child, before it had gained the use of reason, were to be taken from the care of the
parents or in some manner dealt with
against their wishes.
On this basis, the Supreme Pontiffs have
insisted untiringly on the following key
points.
1) Education must tend toward the integral formation of man, in both the natural
and supernatural spheres.
2) The protagonists of this process of
education are, in the most direct and primary way, the parents (and, by extension,
the tutors), i.e., the family, with the cooperation of the Church (in that which
concerns the transcendent dimension of
the human being) and, in a subsidiary way,
the State (whose mission consists in providing facilities for the educative work of
the primary agents, thus to supply their
deficiencies and harmonize their different
activities, with reference to the common
good). This is in no way intended to
prejudice the direct function of the State
in that which concerns military instruction
and purely civic formation.
3) In order that they be able to accomplish this broad educative program, it is
necessary that the juridic norms of each
nation guarantee to the parents the exercise of their rights and duties concerning
the education of their offspring, while giving recognition, and aid, to schools on
every grade level, be they Church or privately owned institutions, provided that
they have the necessary moral, social and
technical qualifications.
4) Due to the exigencies of distributive
justice, the State should cooperate by setting aside a proportional ratio of public
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funds for education, including the establishment of a system of public schools to
supplement private institutions, thus assuring to all the children, young people and
adults of the nation a sufficient education
and, through it, a real equality of opportunity in the collective life of the society.
On this subject, it is especially important for us to draw attention to the often
repeated exhortations of the Popes to all
types of governments-that they respect
the educative mission of parents and make
possible its actual fulfillment. These statements have a direct bearing on the subject
we are analyzing. Leo XIII saw in this
policy one of the distinct roots of all authentically Christian political thought and
one of the most sacred duties of all just
government. In that vein, Pius XI, in addition to expressly contradicting, as we
have seen, the concrete errors of the
"pseudo-liberal" and of the totalitarian
systems, dedicated a special and systematic
attention to the theme of education in two
of his great Encyclicals: Divini Illius Magistri and Casti Connubii. Principally in
the first of these, and in extremely modern
language, he explicitly and energetically defended the educative duty and right of parents against the intrusions of the State. He
considered this a right and duty derived
from the natural law and to be applied
universally, not only to cases involving
Catholic parents. Faithful to the inspiration
of his predecessor, Pius XII did not miss
an opportunity to underline the essential
value of education in itself, and as a foundation of social peace. From the first
encyclical of his Pontificate, he drew attention to the mission of the parents and
of the teachers, the respect due the individual's conscience concerning the cultivation
of the supreme values of the spirit, and the

necessity and urgency of opposing dangerous influences, within and outside the family, in the process of forging and strengthening the humanity of the child.
As a perfect evolutionary recapitulation
of that teaching, John XXIII inscribed
this right of parents to the education of
their children on the tablet of the natural
rights of each and every man: "Parents
have," we read in Pacem In Terris, "the
primary right to maintain and educate
their own children."
Now, in the climate of the Second Vatican Council, and as a preview of the
solemn statements which that great Assembly will doubtless make, on approving
the pastoral Constitution on the relations
of the Church with the modem world, and
more concretely, in the declaration precisely
on the Christian education of the youth,
His Holiness Paul VI has insisted on the
cardinal role that the family must play in
the decisively spiritual enterprise of education.
In the light of all these directives of the
Pontifical Magisterium, and considering
present conciliar tendencies regarding religious liberty and ecumenism, one can and
must insist that the Christian doctrine concerning the educative mission of parents,
and the just position of the State with respect to it, have an increasingly pluralistic
character and, in fact, form a double perspective. First, with regard to recognizing
and sanctioning, in educative matters, the
independent legitimacy of the role of all
the integral domestic communities of the
nation, without diminishing either the mission of the Church in religious formation
of the faithful or the proper function of
the State in safeguarding the common
good. Secondly, with regard to the assumption within the Christian world of the
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principle of religious liberty (correctly
understood, that is, not as autonomy before God, but as autonomy before temporal powers) such that, from day to day,
the various Christian Churches (and even
more distant religious confessions) coincide and unite their efforts in the defense
of the right of the parents to religiously
educate their children, according to their
own beliefs, against the intrusion of other
ecclesiastic or civil institutions.
Present Juridic Perspectives
Having observed, although in very synthetic form, the panorama of ideological
currents which give rise to the problem of
the relations between the family and the
State, in that which most directly affects
the education of the youth, we shall now
attempt to summarize, also in abbreviated
form, the attitudes concerning it which
have been crystallized in contemporary
juridic ordinances, or those which will
appear in the immediate future.
In order to facilitate the integration of
the contributions which the members of
this Congress are able to make within our
discussion, we shall examine successively
in this chapter (as likewise in the other two
chapters of our study) the area of existing
positive law (be it the national laws of the
most important countries, Canon Law, or
international law) and, afterwards, evolutionary legislative proposals and efforts,
stimulated principally by the activities of
the United Nations and the Second Vatican Council.
Existing Positive Law
It obviously is not possible for us to
examine here the entire area of comparative law on this subject. Rather, we must
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confine ourselves to some examples of the
two basic tendencies, i.e., the most "secular" (in whatever form), and the most
authentically democratic and, therefore,
respectful of the educative rights of the
parents in relation to the principle of religious liberty. (This classification is purely
indicative, and we are conscious of the
difficulty which is always involved in any
attempt to enclose the complexities and
dynamism of collective phenomena within
a rational scheme.)
Among the existing positive juridic systems, there are some, in the East as well
as the West, where an excessive intrusion
of the State and, in general, of the public
corporations, still prevails in the field of
education. Such, for example, is the case
in Mexico, where they follow precepts
similar to those contained in article 3 of
the 1917 Constitution. The latter, despite
successive tempering modifications (on the
13th of December, 1934 and on the 30th
of December, 1946), still places the monopoly of national education in the hands
of the State, with the express purpose of
excluding all religious doctrine from the
education of the youth. It also obliges
private schools to follow the same pattern.
It is only fair to recognize that, during the
last quarter of this century, the rigorous
enforcement of these laws has softened.
However, there still exists the inherent
risk of their enforcement, and of the attacks which they now and again produce
from a militant "secularism," e.g., the May,
1963 pastoral letters of the Bishops and
the polemics that followed in the national
press. Knowing the Christian spirit of the
people of Mexico, we are confident, therefore, that, through a process of authentic
democratic evolution, the formal derogation of these precepts and the installation
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of a system truly respectful of the liberty
of beliefs in educative matters will be
achieved.
Almost at geographical antipodes, we
find another series of countries where the
government rigorously imposes its own
ideological beliefs and seriously curbs the
educative rights of the parents, as well as
many other fundamental liberties. Such is
the case of the Eastern European and
Asiatic nations, where political regimes
inspired by dialectic materialism and militant atheism have triumphed. The prototype is the 1936 Constitution of the
U.S.S.R., which imposes a general and
obligatory public school system, separates
the Church from the school, and guarantees the freedom of anti-religious propaganda.
Despite their formal declarations of religious liberty, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China are in line with
the Soviet system. So also is the legislation
of Hungary, Poland, East Germany and
Yugoslavia, although there is somewhat
more respect for the individual conscience
in these countries, due, no doubt, to the
strength of the popular Christian substrata
which lie latent under the prevailing political system.
In all of these totalitarian systems, to a
greater or lesser extent, a respect for the
autonomy of lesser social units and especially of the family, in that which concerns the moral and religious formation
of new generations is inadmissible. Perhaps this is the clearest explanation of why
the proposed United Nations Agreement
For The Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, which was crystallized in
a document approved by the corresponding
subcommittee during the celebrated sessions at Geneva, last January (to which we

will later refer), incurred two dissenting
votes, one from the Soviet Union and one
from Mexico, and a Polish abstention
(three nations which, although proclaiming
in their constitutions the principle of freedom of belief and of religion, obstinately
persist in an exclusive secularism with
regard to matters of education).
On the other hand, the majority of the
countries of the free world include in their
constitutions and in their civil codes the
right and the duty of the parents to educate
their children according to their own religious beliefs within, of course, the limitations that natural morality and the common good impose on the exercise of any
of these fundamental liberties. Thus, in
Europe, such is the fundamental law of
the Federal Republic of West Germany
and it is contained in the constitutions of
Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and
Turkey. Furthermore, in Great Britain, a
broad system of educative liberty prevails,
with attention given to the interests of the
family, their beliefs, and the welfare of the
child. In America, the constitutions of Argentina, Paraguay and the United States of
America emphasize these same points. In
Asia, such is the constitution of Japan and
the same considerations prevail in those of
Africa's Ghana and Morocco.
Due to the uniqueness of their respective
socio-political and religious situations, separate mention is made of the fundamental
laws of Norway, Greece and Spain. In
Norway, the official religion of the State is
Lutheranism, and the citizens who profess
that religion must educate their children in
it. With respect to Greece, the principle of
religious liberty reigns, but its official religion is that of the Eastern Orthodox
Church of Christ, and all education must
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be based on the ideological directives of
Greco-Christian civilization.
With regard to Spain, according to the
basic norms of the existing positive law,
Fuero de los Espanoles of 1945, and the
Law of the Fundamental Principles of the
Movement of the 17th of May, 1958, the
Catholic religion is the official religion of
the nation and the State, and education on
all levels must be inspired by it. Nevertheless, the legislature has forecast, in the
sixth article of the Fuero de los Espanoles,
the principle of tolerance and respect for
religious creeds of non-Catholics in the
private sphere. The existing Concordat between the Spanish State and the Holy See,
executed on the 27th of August, 1953,
despite its reaffirmation of the principle
that all education will be inspired by the
Dogmas of the Catholic religion, explicitly
establishes, in its 27th article, that "the
children of non-Catholics, when their parents (or those who act as parents) request
it" will be dispensed from education in the
Catholic faith.
Further, in article 23, Fuero de los Espanoles states generically that it is the
obligation and, at the same time, the right
of parents to educate and instruct their
children. The Civil Code of 1889 legalizes
this right without distinctions, so that other
norms must be liberally construed so as
not to impose on non-Catholic parents the
difficulty of giving their children a moral
or religious education discrepant with their
own faith. In line with this approach is the
new statute for the regulation of the juridical position of dissident confessions, now
being prepared by the Spanish government.
The norms of Canon Law on this point
are clear, definitive and in line with the
traditional teachings of the Church. The
Code of 1917 declares, on the one hand,
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"the very grave obligation" which parents
have "to procure, with every effort, an
education for their children, as much in
religion and morality, as in the material
and civil areas," a precept indicated to be
as much a right as a duty in the second
paragraph of Canon 1372.
On the other hand, with regard to the
content and levels of Christian education,
the same Code prescribes that, on all
levels, from the elementary schools to the
secondary schools, there must be religious
instruction comparable to the age of the
child (Canon 1373). It orders that Catholic children are not to attend anti-Catholic, neutral, or mixed (that is to say, also
open to anti-Catholics) schools, except in
particular circumstances where, with due
caution, the local ecclesiastical authorities,
in accordance with instructions from the
Holy See, could tolerate such attendance
(Canon 1374). Furthermore, in order to
reinforce what we would call the educative
autonomy of the Catholic family in collaboration with the Church, the Code defines the right of the Church to establish
schools of any discipline and grade, including universities (Canons 1375 to 1379).
Finally, the Church's right to exercise vigilance and authority in all that affects the
religious formation of youth in the different educational centers of the nation is
underlined (Canons 1381 to 1383).
Viewed from this perspective, it would
seem, at first sight, that there is little attention given to freedom of education for
non-Catholic parents, in the sense that they
could send their children to schools where
the religious formation in their own beliefs
would be guaranteed. However, one must
remember that when the Church speaks of
the right and the duty of parents to educate their children, it does so in the name
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of moral exigencies and natural laws which
are, therefore, universal and are not limited
to men of the Catholic faith. Recall on this
point the enlightened text of Pius XI in
the Encyclical Divini illius Magistri, cited
above.
Furthermore, as the Code explicitly
states, the laws contained therein apply
only to those baptized in the Catholic
Church and, consequently, they leave untouched the possible right of parents who
are not formal members of the Church
to the education of their children in their
own beliefs (Canon 12).
Finally, in the majority of Concordats,
including those with Catholic countries,
it is expressly provided that the children
of citizens who do not profess the Catholic
religion should be excepted, at the petition
of their parents, from receiving Catholic
instruction.
We would not want to close this discussion without mentioning that the principles
contained herein are analogically applicable to the peculiar circumstances of
adoptive parents, teachers, godparents and,
in general, those who act as parents and
exercise legal responsibility for the care of
minors (Canon 1335 of the Code).
In the area of international law the explicit and solemn recognition of the rights
of parents to educate their children has
been reinforced since the Second World
War.
The Universal Declaration of the Rights
of Man, approved by the United Nations
on December 10, 1948, not only guarantees to each man the right to liberty of
thought and religious belief, but also emphasizes that this right embraces a series
of liberties, internal and external, and includes the teaching and preaching of one's
own faith (article 18). In addition, it un-

derlines the fact that education must
"attend to the complete development of the
human personality," and reinforces respect
for the rights of man and for his fundamental liberties. It attempts to foster understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all nations and all racial and religious groups. But, above all, and that
which is most important to our present
purposes, it declares solemnly (article 26)
that "parents have priority in the right of
choosing the kind of education their children are to receive."
It was announced at the concluding session of the UNESCO meeting in Hamburg, in January, 1953, that parents are
the first educators of their children. That
same spirit inspired the Charter of the
Rights of Children also approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations
on December 20, 1959.
It is unfortunate that, since the Declaration of 1948 is only a "recommendation,"
many of the member states who subscribed
to it nevertheless seriously violate in practice the educative rights of parents. Therefore, it is praiseworthy that the member
states of the Council of Europe included
in their Agreement for the Protection of
the Rights and Liberties of Man, approved
by the Treaty of Rome, in 1950, the obligation of respecting freedom of conscience
and of religion in all its dimensions, including education, without any further
limitations except, as is logical, those imposed by the law "in a democratic society
for the public security, the protection of
order, health, morality, and other rights
and liberties." In the Paris Protocol Supplement of 1952, the members prescribed
that "the State, in the exercise of its functions in the field of education and of
teaching, will respect the right of parents

It
and assure education and teaching in conformity with their religious and philosophical convictions" (article 2).
Precisely in order to end the discrimination that still exists in the area of religious
liberty and, within it, against the rights of
parents in the education of their offspring,
the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its seventeenth session, December,
1962, agreed to prepare a declaration and
another pact "in order to eliminate all the
forms of religious intolerance." After
numerous difficulties, the complete subcommittee, in its celebrated meetings at
Geneva last January, approved, as is well
known, a resolution that constitutes a "proposed pact" of thirty articles.
While we cannot enter into an analysis
of its structure and content, it is especially
important for us to underline certain points
that directly concern the material which
we are examining.
1) It assures to every human being the
liberty of embracing any religion or belief
and of changing it, according to the dictates of his conscience and free of any
coercion. It also guarantees his right to the
public or private manifestation of his
faith.
2) It confirms that this liberty includes
not only the right to honor, pay tribute to
and make the pilgrimages of his faith, etc.,
but also the liberty of "teaching, divulging,
and learning his religion or belief-its
sacred language and its traditions, and to
prepare people who wish to dedicate themselves to its activities." Further, it insists
that this liberty includes the practice of his
religion or belief in the establishment and
maintenance of charitable and educational
institutions (article 3 of the "proposed
pact").
In addition, this "proposed pact" main-
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tains that the agreeing states must oblige
themselves to respect "the primary right of
the parents and, in their place, the tutors,
to select a religion or belief for their children." It is hoped that the proposed agreement will be definitively approved by the
Assembly of the United Nations, despite
the arguments against it, formulated, as we
said, by those states where a "secular" concept of public life and especially of the
educative system is predominant. Let us
also hope that, as a result, the intrusions
of the State in this area, so seriously
damaging to human rights, will gradually
disappear. Of course, the State can and
must continue to secure a reciprocal respect among the distinct racial and religious
groups in the nation, and must provide
adequate technical and pedagogical facilities for both public and private education.
Tensions Between the Husband and
Wife With Respect to the Education
of the Children
Until now we have concerned ourselves
principally with the basic question of the
relations-in harmony and in discord-between the family, considered as a whole,
and the State. But our analysis would remain seriously deficient if we did not examine the interior tensions within the
family itself, between its founders, the
parents, and also between them and the
children (we shall cover this last aspect
in the following chapter).
It is a painful but true fact that in the
bosom of the home there arise, at times,
differences and even serious arguments
between the spouses concerning the education of the children, especially in its
moral and religious aspects. But before
entering into an analysis of these tensions
it seems indispensable to us to point out,
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although in very succinct form, the characteristic roots of the social change that
has occurred during the last one hundred
years.
Generically considered, although confining ourselves to the Western World and,
within it, to the middle class family (since
an examination of other types of families,
in oriental countries, and also those of the
working, farming and, above all, industrial
classes would make matters too complicated to handle here), it is noteworthy
that, until the end of the nineteenth
century and, in some regions, even until
well into the twentieth century, a situation
had prevailed which we could call the
"Roman image of the family," strongly
hierarchical, with "monarchical" power
very much concentrated in the hands of
the father. A spirit of obedience and monologue permeated the paternal-filial relationship.
This is not to say that the rebellious romantic movements characteristic of the
second half of the nineteenth century did
not attack this concept many times. They
did, but from a sociological point of view,
they failed to alter it in any generic sense.
Within this concept, the educative mission
of the parents was centered very definitely
on the father, at least in a juridic sense
(although, in fact, the mother has always
been a very active participant in the moral
and religious formation of the children,
above all during infancy and adolescence).
This attitude is manifested in the majority of the Civil Codes promulgated in
the past century. Let us take for example
the Napoleonic Code, the senior of all
those of Western Europe, which in its first
rendit'on of article 373, as we will see later,
attributed to the father, that is to say to the
male, a monopoly of family authority. Or

consider the Spanish Civil Code of 1889,
which, in its article 154, states that family
authority over minor legitimate sons is
concentrated in the father and, in his absence, in the mother (although without
failing to note, as we shall emphasize later,
a very important participation of the
mother in some substantial ways).
That which we would very respectfully
call the "traditional" attitude of the Catholic Church moves in the same direction,
although it must be recognized that, to
its honor, the Church has always opposed
the preponderance or abuse of the father's
power in the bosom of the family, or in regard to the wife or with respect to the relationship between the parents and the children.
Furthermore, thz Church has underlined
in every instance that the union of the husband and wife must be a union of love and
of peace, similar to the union of Christ
with His Church; that the power of thfather is not a despotic or tyrannical power
but a "political" one, subject, therefore, to
ethical and juridic norms, in service always
to the common good of the family and the
personal well being of each one of his children and that to the mother belongs an
indispensable educative function in the
bosom of the home. But along with this
dedication to principles and moral exigencies, it is a fact that the prevalent tendency among traditional Catholics of the
nineteenth century and part of the twentieth (even with support from some texts
of the Pontifical Magisterium, like Leo
X1lI's Encyclical, QuodApostoliciMuneris
of 1878) has been a defense of the pyramidal structure of the family, vitalized and
mitigated by the necessity for a reciprocal
charity and respect.
During the decades in which we have
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lived, the socioeconomic, cultural and political transformations have been so intense
that they could not fail to be reflected
strongly-in both their good and bad aspects-in the structure of the family, above
all, as it affects our discussion most directly, in regard to a certain leveling of
the husband and wife concerning the exercise of family power and in regard to the
new pedagogical methods in the formation
of the children. The "monarchic" approach
which tended to monopolize power in the
hands of the father is giving way to the
dynamism of social life, resulting in a certain "diarchy," a combine of power in the
hands of the father and the mother together. This "family power," while it remains an inherent right of the family, is interpreted still more in the sense of a function of duty and service. We will examine
both aspects of the problem.
With regard to the position or respective
levels of the spouses, it is not necessary to
point out that the change that has occurred has been rapid and fundamental,
due to the effect of very diverse factors
which have vigorously and inexorably promoted that which has been called the "advancement of womanhood," both within
and outside the home. The Holy Fathers
have proclaimed it with increasing clarity,
without failing to note certain dangers that
could threaten the very dignity of a woman
and her most genuine functions. They have
exalted the value of this process and have
emphasized the essential role of the mother
in the education and, above all, religious
training of the young.
World War II accelerated this process.
Pius XII, with his sharp sensitivity, echoed
it. While fighting against the serious dangers to the dignity of womanhood, lurking
in certain degenerative aspects of contem-
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porary life, he underlined strongly her
very essential role in domestic and social
education and praised all the positive aspects of the movement promoting the feminine sex, both within the family and in the
community at large.
His Holiness, John XXIII, took decisive
steps in the same direction; considering the
advancement of the woman as one of the
signs of our times, and emphasizing the
equality of rights and of duties between
the man and the woman when creating a
family, and when exercising, with the husband (speaking of them in the plural), the
mission of maintaining and educating the
children.
Finally, His Holiness, Paul VI, in addressing himself to the International Union
of Family Organizations, has refused to
ignore the great transformations that have
occurred within the family. While voicing
some legitimate anxieties, he has nevertheless unequivocally stated that the Church
is in accord with the positive aspects of
many of these innovations, principally in
that which refers to the greater liberty of
conscience of each of the spouses and to
a more lively interest in the education of
the children.
This social change has, of course, produced deep repercussions in existing positive law (as we shall see later). The position of the woman in the administration
of the home and, above all, in the education of the children (which is here most
directly important to us), has been or is
being explicitly recognized, depending on
the particular country involved. This does
not eliminate but rather, in a certain sense,
accentuates certain problems, like the resolution of the tensions or conflicts between
the spouses, which endanger "family
unity."
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As a matter of fact, there is still no complete agreement among moralists and jurists as to whether it is possible to recognize an absolute equality of the father and
the mother in the management of the
family. No one seriously disputes-we repeat-that the wife is an active subject,
a protagonist, and not a mere passive subject (at times almost an object) in the
marriage and in the family; nor does anyone deny her a co-participation, to a
greater or lesser degree, in the exercise of
family power. But the problem is more complicated when it involves spouses with very
divergent opinions regarding the administration of the home and, more precisely,
with respect to the moral and religious
education of the children. The problem is
whether the reasoned (non-arbitrary) opinion of the father should ultimately prevail,
or whether it should defer to a formula
which combines the attitudes of both
spouses or supercedes them, through the
intervention of some legal organ outside
the family. The question is found-as we
shall see-in the majority of existing juridic systems.
Since marriage has an unquestionable
aspect of a pact or contract resting on the
mutual consent of the parties, and since it
is related to the juridic-natural principle
of "pacta sunt servanda," an important
criteria for resolving such marital problems, especially in cases of "mixed religion" are the "matrimonial capitulations"
agreed to before the marriage. But it must
not be forgotten that we are dealing with
a pact sui generis which, however, gives
birth to an institution with essential roots
that cannot be modified at the will of the
parties. Accordingly, the welfare of the
family, the spiritual interests of the offspring, and the respect for the intimacy of

beliefs which evolve with time, oblige us to
search for equitable formulae which are or
could be applicable to situations other
than those foreseen by the spouses on a
particular day.
Besides this process of equalizing the
husband and wife, which we have just expounded in a general way, another characteristic of the change which the family is
undergoing is-as we have said-the fact
that the family power is being increasingly
understood not so much as a subjective
right of the parents (which it continues in
fact to be), but rather as a duty and a
function of service. The paternal-filial relationship is leaning towards a spirit of
reciprocal understanding and of dialogue,
although in not a few instances this has
produced outbreaks of rebellion, with anarchical tendencies within the domestic
community. In one way or another, the
strongly hierarchical and unilateral structure of the family is being sociologically replaced by a more communal and informal
image.
All this cannot but have repercussions in
the concepts of marriage itself and of the
home. We are living through the epiphany
of a new concept of both, latent in many
of the publications of Christian intellectuals of our time and, above all, in the discussions of the Fathers gathered at the
Second Vatican Council from all over the
world.
Awareness of the personal element in
religiosity is being accentuated; there is a
search for a more lucid, comprehensive
and harmonious relationship between authority and obedience within the family.
There is likewise a very strong emphasis
on the functional dimension of family authority. Consequently, there is a blending
of both the personal and social educative
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rights and duties of the parents with respect to their children. There is also an
inclination toward new forms of liberty of
teaching within that great public service
which is education. But, above all (and this
is the point that most concerns us) there
is a determined advance toward the recognition of religious liberty as a natural right
of each man and, in consequence, there
is a precognizance of reforms in the Canon
Law concerning the requirements in cases
of mixed marriage and the exercise of the
educative function.
It is to be hoped that the declaration on
religious liberty, which the Council is preparing, as well as the schema on the relations of the Church with the modern
world, will indicate a decisive crystallization of these currents and will occasion all
Christians to defend the educative liberty
of parents, and the necessity of respect for
the conscience of the children in all the
legal systems of the world.
Through these enlightening considerations (which would actually require
broader development), we can synthesize
panoramically the tensions and conflicts
which can and do arise within the family
situation, and which specifically concern
the problem of the religious education
of the offspring, with respect to the beliefs
of the parents and the normal or abnormal
relations between the spouses.
In order to facilitate this discussion, we
shall distinguish the different possible situations:
1) Situations in which father and mother
are of the same faith or both father and
mother are non-believers.
Despite the increasingly pluralistic nature of contemporary society, this is perhaps the most ordinary situation, especially
in countries where there exists a preva-
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lent religion, or a social climate of antireligiosity. In this situation, if the husbandwife relationship is "normal" (relatively
speaking, since even in homes with the
greatest peace and security there are differences of temperament and of ideas
which affect religious attitudes), the father
and the mother will operate harmoniously
in the formation of their children and will
give them, through their own efforts or
through those of freely chosen educators,
the necessary instruction so that the children may also embrace, consciously and
freely, the religious attitudes of their parents.
From a human point of view, this is the
ideal situation because it creates a more
homogeneous climate of deep communion
in supreme values of the spirit and in the
transcendent dimension of personal destiny.
In these cases, the function of both
Church and State must be to agree to respect the legitimate autonomy of the parents in the formation of the souls of their
children. It is certain that within the
juridic discipline of the Catholic Church,
parents who profess that religion have a
very serious moral obligation-according
to what we have seen of the existing Code
of Canon Law-of baptizing their children, and of educating them in the faith,
and in general, within the home or in
Catholic schools. It would not be licit to
permit their attendance at anti-Catholic,
neutral or mixed schools, except when
competent ecclesiastic authority tolerates
such attendance, in particular circumstances and with the exercise of due caution.
It is clear that when dealing with parents of religions different from Catholicism, i.e., separated Christians or nonChristians, the Roman Church, although
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perhaps with difficulty, also respects the
right of the parents to baptize and to form
their children in line with their own beliefs, and definitively prohibits anyone being obliged by force to accept the Catholic
faith: Ad amplexandam fidem catholicam
nemo invitus cogatur.
In relation to this principle, which we
could call respect for the ideological autonomy of parents in relation to their children, we must discuss the delicate and
complex problem of the attitude that the
Church and the State, each one in its own
order, must adopt in cases where both parents are non-believers or, more precisely,
atheists.
Since religious values are an essential
element of man's integrity, is it not fitting
that the agreement of the father and mother
in this conception of the world and of
life should produce an intervention of the
ecclesiastic or civil authorities on behalf
of the children? With some justifiable anxiety, and submitting my judgment at all
times to that of the ecclesiastical Magisterium, it seems to me that it is necessary
to make a distinction. If the incredulity of
the parents is a mere agnosticism or indifference to the religious problem, but does
not amount to an active intervention
against the awakening of religious awareness in the souls of their children, all authorities outside the family ought to abstain
from intervening, for the rights of the parents in the formation of their children belongs to the natural law. In this connection, the words of Pius XI in the Encyclical, Divini illius Magistri, in which the
Pontiff makes reference to this right as a
right of all men, seem to me of extraordinary importance.
If the attitude of the parents were that
of militant atheists, would not a prudent

intervention of the State, by means of an
accredited teaching organization, as is now
permitted in a very general way in the
majority of juridic regulations dealing with
the curtailing of abuses against the health
or natural morality of children, be licit?
I think that the answer would have to be
in the affirmative, although any such measure would always have to be strictly interpreted as a temporary and exceptional
measure, effective only until the parents
gave guarantees of respect for the conscience of the child.
If the marriage relations are disturbed
and arrive at a breaking point, then the
question arises as to which of the two
spouses will continue to. exercise the educative function, especially with regard to
the religious formation of the children. It
is obvious that "a priori" solutions can not
be given on this point. In the case of an
amicable separation, it will be the husband
and wife themselves who will resolve this
difficulty, or it will be, in an extreme situation, the competent judicial authority
who will in fact resolve it, bearing in mind
not only the innocence or culpability of
one or another of the spouses, but also and
very principally the spiritual interest of
the child.
2) Situations in which a religious disparity exists.
The problem is more serious when there
is a disparity of beliefs between the husband and wife, whether they are both of
a positive faith, but of different confessions, or whether one of the spouses is a
believer and the other a non-believer or
an atheist. Here arise the most painful tensions and those most difficult of solution.
In an attempt to illuminate this subject as
much as possible, we shall distinguish, as
we have done before, "normal" marital re-
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lations from cases involving a disturbance
of matrimonial tranquillity.
In the first case, that is to say, where
the marriage is harmonious, the pattern
for the religious education of the children will have been established, in principle, as we have already mentioned, by the
agreements that the spouses executed on
this point prior to contracting the marriage.
Subsidiarily, it will also be controlled by
the criteria imposed by the positive law and
by the necessity of securing the spiritual
well-being of the child and the peace of
the family.
Simply from the point of view of natural
reason, it is necessary to eliminate the
possibility of both husband and wife trying
to influence contradictorily the spiritual
development of the child, because this
would occasion a true psychological torture
of the child and a serious threat of indifferentism. Rather than risk such a situation,
it is preferable that the future spouses
compromise, if neither is Catholic, with
respect to the religious formation of the
children. That is, they should agree to raise
the children in line with the belief of one of
the spouses, which would not have to necessarily be that of the father (whose position of supremacy, as we have seen, is in
a process of transformation). While living
together, the spouses should respect such
an agreement in order to avoid the greater
damage that an active conflict of the discrepant religious attitudes of the parents
would produce in the soul of the child.
Acquiring his own criteria, through his
reason and his personality, the child can
then choose which parental religion satisfies the deep yearnings of his own heart.
The case is different when one of the
spouses is Catholic. We here confront the
most difficult question of mixed religious
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marriages, an issue which continues to be
one of our most important problems, having many times caused extremely painful
obstacles to the contemporary ecumenical
cl'mate. You all know well the present
traditional attitude of the Catholic Church
on this point, crystallized in her Code of
Canon Law (which we shall summarize).
Long and painful experience teaches us
that this type of marriage frequently results in a grave spiritual crisis for one or
another of the spouses, with a corresponding effect on the children. This explains the
unfavorable attitude of the Church, not
only the Catholic Church, but frequently
the Protestant Churches as well. The same
dangers can occur, and with even greater
seriousness, if the discrepancy is not between Christians of different confessions,
but between a Christian and the believer
of a non-Christian religious faith.
It occurs frequently in the modern secularized world that one of the spouses retains
his religiosity, while the other is agnostic
or openly hostile to any form of religiosity.
The conflicts can then be extraordinarily
serious, and in the present climate of respect for the religious liberty of each person
and, moreover, of gradual recognition of
joint authority of the father and the mother
in the education of the children, it does
not seem just that the criteria for solution
should always be one of the predominance of the will of the father or the predominance of the Catholic spouse. Rather,
we should attempt to arrive at a more
flexible formula for the pastoral intervention of the Churches to which the spouses
belong, above all, if both are Christian.
Finally, in the most difficult cases, this
should include a moderate intervention of
the State by means of competent judicial
or educative authority.
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In the case of families with internal religious plurality, if a separation or break
occurs, there would be no other remedy
than to confide in the State (by means of
the competent judicial authority, or better,
by means of an educational organ) the
establishment of the patterns for the education of the children who remain in the
custody of one or the other of the spouses,
according to their relative degree of innocence or guilt, but attending always principally to the welfare of the offspring.
Present Juridic Perspectives
Existing Positive Law
As we already stated, in describing these
tensions, the civil codes of the past century,
stemming from the French Code of 1803,
are based in large measure on the "Roman
image" of paternal authority, with a subordinate or subsidiary authority for the
mother. In fact, in the first edition of article
213 of the Napoleonic Code, it was said,
laconically: "the husband must protect his
wife, and the wife must obey her husband."
In the same vein, and with reference to the
education of the children, article 373 of
the same Code, in its original form, established with no less a monopolistic spirit,
that "only the father exercises this authority [authority over minor or unemancipated children] during the marriage."
However, through the influence of exigencies newly revealed to the human conscience, reforms have been introduced
since 1938, which crystallized, above all,
in the Law of the 23rd of July, 1942. Pursuant to it, the original article 213 was
changed to read that the father is the head
of the family and exercises this function in
the "common interest of the home and of
the children." But the woman now concurs

with the husband in securing the moral and
material administration of the family, in
providing for its sustenance, in educating
the children, and in preparing them for
their professions in life; she even replaces
the husband "in his function as head of the
family" in those cases in which the husband
is incapacitated, absent, far from the home
or for any other reason incapable of performing his function.
The said Law of 1942 also modified the
old article 373, and established that authority over the children "belongs to the father
and to the mother" and, although the father
exercises it during the marriage in his role
as head of the family, it, nevertheless,
could be passed to the mother in those
cases in which the father forfeits his rights
(according to the Law of July 24, 1889),
either having been condemned for abandoning the family or having in effect abandoned his authority. Furthermore, it should
be borne in mind that the preamble to the
French Constitution of the Fifth Republic
(September 28, 1958) strongly emphasizes
the equality of rights of man and woman.
This cannot help but influence the interpretation that is otherwise given to the text
of the Code.
A similar evolutionary process has occurred in Italy. The existing Code, which
remains substantially the Rocco Code, of
1942, notwithstanding its relatively recent
date, maintains a traditional position on
this matter. In effect, after stating that the
child is subject to the authority of his
parents until coming of age or emancipation, it emphasizes that this authority is
exercised by the father, and only after his
death (or in other circumstances established by law) by the mother (articles 316
and 317). Nevertheless, the same Code,
on the regulation of marriage, states that
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this "imposes on both husband and wife
the obligation of maintaining, educating
and instructing the offspring," and adds
that "such education and instruction must
conform to the principles of morality"
(article 147).
Prior to the adoption of the new Constitution of the Republic (December 27,
1947), many commentators were inclined
to maintain the principle which we could
call "predominance or priority" of the paternal power, even in the area of education
of the children, when differences arose in
the home. Their purpose was to preserve
the unity of the family, without attempting
in any way to eliminate a very active participation of the mother in the entire educative process, above all in the religious
and moral areas.
The promulgation of this Constitution
has promoted the tendency of "equalization," as we would call it, since it is the
concept which inspires the generic principle
of identical social dignity and of equality
of all citizens before the law, "without distinction as to sex" (article 3). Moreover,
and very precisely, the Constitution of
1947 establishes that "the marriage will be
governed by the moral and juridic equality
of the spouses," with limitations established
by the law for safeguarding the family
unity (article 29).
The sharp juridic spirit that has always
characterized the Italian people is taking
this opportunity to develop a fine debate
concerning the scope of these constitutional
declarations and their influence on precepts
of the Civil Code. Some jurists, basing
themselves precisely on the language of the
Second Paragraph of article 29 (concerning the establishment of limitations in the
law in order to "guarantee family unity"),
are inclined to maintain that article 316 of
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the Civil Code remains in effect. However, others defend a contrary interpretation. They appear to be supported by several legal decisions and invoke, in reference
to education, article 147 of the Code and
article 30 of the Constitution, which establish the instruction and education of the
children as a right and a duty of both parents (speaking of them in the plural and
without distinction as to sex).
On the whole, it can be said that Italian
jurisprudence looks toward formulae which
harmonize the unity of the family, on one
hand, with respect for the rights of the
mother and the welfare of the children,
on the other. Of course, in cases of very
serious disparity, it may be necessary to
resort to the limited intervention of judicial organs of a tutelar character.
With regard to Spain, we are faced with
a problem which is in some aspects the
same, but set in the rather unique context
of its juridico-political system. The Civil
Code of 1889, strongly influenced, as is
well known, by the French Code, establishes a system pursuant to which a dominant authority is given to the father and a
subsidiary role to the mother. The Code
provides that "the father and, in his
absence, the mother, have authority over
their legitimate unemancipated children;
and the children must obey them while
remaining in their household and must always give them respect and obedience"
(article 154).
More precisely, and again within this
hierarchical context, the Code establishes
that the father and, in his absence, the
mother, have, with respect to their minor
children, the duty of feeding them, caring
for them, educating and instructing them.
They also have the authority to correct and
reasonably chastise them, including the
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right to solicit the aid of such governmental or judicial authority as the case may
require (articles 155 to 157).
Certain observations must be made
which point toward a more liberal interpretation of these precepts and a more
adequate understanding of them. In the
first place, it is important to note that, within the Spanish judicial tradition, from the
Visigothic Period through the entire M~ddle
Ages, we find parental authority exercised
jointly by the spouses. This has been
pointed out in the important works of Professors Urena, Gisbert and others, and
there is a vestige of this tradition in statutory laws, especially in Aragon, Navarre,
and Vizcaya.
Moreover, there are many Code commentators who are inclined to recognize an
active and authentic participation on the
part of the mother and a joint right with
the father in the education of the children
(although, in other areas, especially with
regard to the juridic representation of the
children, the father prevails, while living
and otherwise retaining his authority).
In any case, there is a growing tendency
among Spanish jurists to recognize the
necessity for a modification of the Code on
this point, so as to emphasize the participation of the mother in the exercise of parental authority, and in order to facilitate more
equitable solutions in cases of disagreement
between the spouses concerning, above
all, the education of the children.
This tendency is reinforced by the fact
that the Fuero de Los Espanoles of 1945,
states, in plural form, that "the parents are
obliged to feed, educate and instruct their
children" (article 23). Since this language
is neither hierarchical nor discriminatory,
as between the spouses, and since they are
said to have an equal duty, they must also

have an identical right and should participate in a joint mission. In cases of serious
differences between the spouses, it will be
the competent judicial authority which will
definitively and fairly decide the issues
involved, considering the conduct of each
of the spouses and the welfare of the child.
W-th regard to the treatment of this subject in other countries, it is interesting to
po'nt out the prevalence of that tendency
which favors a joint or equal authority of
the parents in matters concerning the
children. In Portugal, the Civll Code provides that the mother should participate in
the paternal power, and must be heard in
all matters involving the interests of the
children. However, during the marriage,
it is the father, as head of the family, who
exercises, in a special way, this authority
over and protection of the children (article
138).
In Switzerland, the Code of 1907 declares explicitly that "the father and the
mother exercise jointly the parental authority during the marriage," but adds that,
in cases of disagreement, "the decision of
the father will prevail" (article 274).
In countries having an Anglo-Saxon
heritage, there is an increasing tendency
toward an equality of the parents in matters
regarding the education of the children,
with primary attention given to the interests of the latter. Such is the case in Great
Britain and in the United States of
America.
In the area of Canon Law, it is necessary
to distinguish the generic principle of the
joint participation of the parents in the
education of the children, on the one hand,
from the particular case of mixed marriages, on the other. With regard to the
first aspect of the problem, the Code of
1917, while in line with the traditional
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concept of the family, points out that the
educative function pertains jointly to the
father and the mother. Canon 1113 states,
in the plural, that "the parents have the
very serious obligation of procuring an
education for their children." Consequently, a sensu contrario, it must be concluded that they have a joint right to fulfill
that duty.
However, what happens if disputes arise
regarding the religious education of the
children? Will the father, as head of the
family, resolve them? Up to now, the solution provided by the Code has been what
we could call the "principle of favoring
the Catholic faith."
In cases of disputes in a marriage involving a Catholic party, the educative
criteria of the Catholic spouse had to prevail, unless the competent ecclesiastical
authorities had decided otherwise in the
interests of the children. We may infer
that this would apply to difficulties involving the separation of the spouses and
custody of the children. In fact, one of
the causes of such separations, according
to the Code, is precisely the fact that "one
of the spouses gives his name to a nonCatholic sect or gives the children a nonCatholic education." Once the separation
is in effect, "the children must be educated
according to the beliefs of the innocent
spouse and if one of the, spouses is nonCatholic, according to -the views of the
Catholic spouse, provided in either case
that the Ordinary has not decreed something else, attending always to the welfare
of the children and the preservation of
their Catholic education." The same principle still inspires the rules concerning
"mixed marriages."
In the Code of Canon Law, it is understood that, as a matter of Divine Law, a
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marriage is illicit if there is danger of perversion of the Catholic spouse or of the
offspring. The Church "severely prohibits"
such marriages, and only dispenses from
this impediment for just and serious causes,
and on the basis that the non-Catholic
spouse must give guarantees of not exposing his Catholic spouse to dangers of perversion. Moreover, both spouses guarantee
that all the children will be baptized and
educated in the Catholic religion alone.
These promises must be given in writing
and there must be a moral certainty that
they will in fact be fulfilled. Furthermore,
there is a prohibition against approaching
a minister of a non-Catholic sect, whether
before or after the Catholic marriage ceremony, for the purpose of receiving matrimonial consent or authorization. In addition, the proper ecclesiastical authorities
must give careful attention to the performance of the promises made by the spouses.
All these requirements are equally applicable to the marriage of Catholic persons with those who have notoriously abandoned the faith, although they are not
affiliated with a non-Catholic sect; and
with those who have given their names to
associations condemned by the Church.
Since this Canonic norm remains in
effect and unmodified, it is evident that in
case of a difference between the spouses
concerning the religious formation of the
children, the educative rights of the Catholic spouse would have to prevail, regardless of whether the father or the mother
were the Catholic party (which alone
causes serious problems). In cases of
marital separation, however, there is one
very important exception. These regulations apply only so long as competent ecclesiastical authority has not decreed otherwise, for the benefit of the children and
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the preservation of their Catholic education.
The Conciliar climate has brought about
a very decisive transformation in this area
as well as in others. In the Third Session
of the Second Vatican Council, the Fathers
sent a message to the Pope, urging him to
modify, through his supreme authority, the
existing legislation on this matter. They
specifically asked that the non-Catholic
spouse be exempted from the necessity
of educating his or her children in the
Catholic religion. Although that obligation
would remain with the Catholic spouse,
he should only be required to remain
faithful to his conscience, rather than to
the existing requirements of Canon Law.
Without eliminating the problem entirely, this will alleviate any excessive psychological burdens, and will, perhaps,
make it possible for the spouses to respect
the interior peace of the souls of their
children.
In the international field, the principle
of the identical dignity, worth and equality
of rights of men and women has been decisively applied. Language to this effect appears in the Preamble and in article I,
paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United
Nations, adopted at San Francisco on June
26, 1945. The Universal Declaration of
the Rights of Man (1948) establishes the
same criteria. More concretely and precisely with reference to education, it provides (in the plural and non-hierarchically)
that "the parents have the prior right to
choose the kind of education their children are to receive" (article 26, paragraph
3). Similar criteria were adopted in the
European Agreement for the Safeguarding
of the Rights and Fundamental Liberties
of Man, where the mission of the parents
in educating and instructing their children

according to their religious and philosophical convictions is spoken of in the plural.
Tensions Between the Child and
His Parents Regarding His Religious
Education
When there is discord or discrepancy in
the religious area between the parents and
the child, there arise new and painful difficulties. In principle, the parents have at
once a duty and the right to direct their
child in all aspects of his education, especially in the moral and religious areas.
On this point, there is substantial agreement among Catholic and non-Catholic
theologians, and with the major portion
of existing legislation. Even those who criticize most severely the traditional concepts
of parental authority recognize that it is
the parents who control the spiritual development of their minor children and that
it is not licit for their educative function to
be opposed without serious cause.
It is certain that one's religious life is
at all times something intimate, untransferable, intensely personal-one does not
inherit a faith as one inherits certain somatic conditions, temperament or nationality. All authentic religiosity passes sooner or
later through a crisis, through a real process of conversion in which the child, and
especially, the adolescent overcomes the
"social phase" of his religious life, as something received from without, and becomes
conscious of its drama-the drama of Redemption-which is the dialogue of the
soul with God. A temporary loss of faith
often occurs at that critical moment. It is
a risk of human freedom, a risk which God
permits in order that the path toward Him
be always traveled in love and understanding. Those who are entrusted with the care
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of souls and those who dictate the juridic
norms that regulate collective life can not
approach this reality with rigid and inflexible categories.
With regard to the child of agnostic or
atheistic parents, who one day feels in his
heart the call of the faith, or another who,
educated in an environment of Catholic religiosity, falls away from the faith at a
particular moment in his development and
embraces indifference or another religious
conviction, it is necessary to provide some
kind of tutelage or direction, with the least
possible damage to the peace of the family.
In these always painful situations, which
is to prevail, the educative mission of the
parents or the independence of the child?
We are aware that we here touch on one
of the most delicate aspects of the problem
we are examining.
The problem has become especially
acute in our time, not only because the
conditions of modern life facilitate and
even instigate, at times, the assumption
by the child of an attitude of autonomy
with respect to the family, but also because
the human conscience has become increasingly aware of the necessity of respecting
the dignity of the child. The child can never
be considered as a mere "object" of education, or as an "instrument" at the service of the family. Rather, he must be
treated as a person, as a protagonist in the
family community, as a future citizen and,
finally, as an image of God, equal to his
parents.
Furthermore, we modify our position
ever more deeply as we come to understand the meaning of the dialectic relation
between authority and liberty within the
home, between command and dialogue,
and between hierarchy and integration in a
"communal friendship."
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Finally, the development of moral and
religious teachings on this subject has been
influenced to a great extent by deep psychological and psychiatric studies, and the
consequent growing awareness of the need
for respecting the conscience of all human
beings, regardless of their age. This does
not mean that parents, or those who act
on their behalf, should abandon their educative mission and blindly submit in all
cases. Nor does it mean that they must
forego any attempt to influence the spiritual
formation of the child. It simply means that
any such formation must be accomplished
without interfering with the free development of the child's conscience, with loving tact and deep respect for the growing
personality of the child.
His Holiness, Paul VI, has spoken of
this subject:
If the educator were to confine his activity solely to a patient, meticulous and, if
you wish, scientific examination of the environment in which the child develops today, realizes his experience and shapes his
personality, it would not be a complete job.
There would be a danger that the educator,
admired of the phenomenology of the environment, would accept it as it is, would
describe it very well and would classify it
according to very beautiful categories, but
would do little or nothing to modify that
environment and its consequent phenomena. He would conclude in accepting
them or, even, in defending them as an
expression of our times. We think, for example, that to simply describe the environment whose spectacle surrounds the child
is not enough. The educator is not a passive observer of the phenomena of juvenile
life; he must be a friend, a teacher, a trainer, a healer, a father who is not so much
interested in knowing the behaviour of his
pupil in a given set of circumstances, but
rather in preserving him from useless offenses and in teaching him how to love,
enjoy life and sublimate his experience....
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This is because the environment, by itself,
does not make men. There is nothing like
rebellious youth, with little understanding
of the precepts of the past, especially those
closest to them, imitatively adoring instead
that which is fashionable and new. Wake
up in these young souls the ability to judge,
to free themselves and to find their identity
as human beings and not as numbers in a
crowd.

The tensions that these factors give rise
to can be very complex and consequently
there is a need for flexible formulae within
indispensable guarantees of "juridic security."
Subject to a degree of relativity essential to any compartmentalization of man's
psychological evolution, it can be said
that the first period of a child's life (something almost prejuridic) embraces the first
seven years of his existence, i.e., from birth
to the age when it can be said that he acquires self-awareness and the full use of
his reason. During this phase, there are
obviously moments of tension and discord,
but these are of an instinctive or temperamental rather than ideological character.
During these years, the educative mission
of the parents and especially of the mother
can and must be exercised to its fullest
extent, above all in the areas of moral and
religious formation. This does not mean
that she should impose physical or moral
violence on the child, the vestiges of which
remain forever in the deep psyche of the
child. On the contrary, the educative mission is to be accomplished by means of
moral stimulants which cause a religious
awareness to form in the soul of the child,
such that it will make the religious beliefs
of its parents its own.
It would be contrary to reason and
seriously injurious to the rights of the
parents if foreign elements were to be in-

jected into this family dialogue, except in
extreme cases of brutality, i.e., of authentic
abuses of parental rights, when the State,
by means of adequate educative organs or
institutions, must intervene.
In the second phase of child development, tensions can, and in fact do, multiply
in the majority of families. This is the age
when the individual, through his studies,
is first exposed to half truths. The unsuspected horizons of life roll back and his
energies grow on all levels. Anxieties and
emotional difficulties begin to occur. This
all happens when the mystery of life first
begins to reveal itself and, above all, when
he enters a university or other institution
of higher learning. His personality is forming and his character is asserting itself,
while the tremendous adventure of his personal conscience is beginning. It is then
that the most difficult and, at times, most
violent conflicts arise within the home, especially if the parents seek to remedy the
situation through an assertion of their own
will, an application of their own criteria
and, perhaps, resort to sanctions. There
are, after all, two equally sacred and undeniable rights involved in these situations:
the right, duty and function of parents in
the education of their children and in forming them religiously according to their own
faith; and the right of the child to a free
conscience and a free quest for his destiny.
The legislator can not remain indifferent
to these conflicts, especially if there is a
difference not only as between the parents
and the child, but also between the parents,
regarding the attitude which they should
adopt. As in the other instances discussed,
the intervention of the State must be subsidiary. At the request of either of the
parents or of the child, it will have to take
action at a given moment and, by means
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of an appropriate administrative body, attempt to mitigate, as much as possible, the
damage resulting from the conflict. Of
course, it will be necessary to estimate
what we would call the child's age of "religious majority."
Present Juridic Perspectives
Existing Positive Law
Until the present moment, it has not
been possible for us to gather information
dealing with the paternal-filial conflicts in
regard to education so that an adequate
picture of the juridic situation in the principal countries of the world might be presented. Therefore, we shall now attempt to
point out some basic considerations in
summary form, subject, of course, to such
additional material as the members of this
Congress are able to provide.
1) Until the child comes of age (which,
as you know, is generally fixed between
the ages of 18 and 23), the usual rule is
that the decision of the parents will prevail
with respect to his moral and religious
formation.
2) The intervention of an educative organ or of the competent judicial authority
is provided for in cases where the parents
have seriously abused their authority in
the area of the child's religious education
or in any other area.
3) In order to minimize the harm
that results from a psychological-religious
break in the educative process, it is especially important to bear in mind the interests and well-being of the child when
tension or conflict results from a change in
the religion or ideology of the parents
during the child's formative years.
As concerns the presently effective positive law of the Catholic Church, Canons
113 and 1372 of the Code-as we have
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already seen-fix no time limits on the
right and the "very serious obligation"
that the parents have of procuring a religious and moral education for their children. It seems implicit in Canons 1372
to 1382 that the educative mission of the
parents, with regard to the spiritual formation of their children, continues until the
latter enter the university, i.e., practically
until they leave the family home.
In the international sphere, it is necessary to say, in the first place, that the recognition of the rights of the human being,
especially the right to an education and the
right to religious liberty, is stated in existing texts without any discrimination as to
age (The San Francisco Charter, The
Universal Declaration of the Rights of
Man of 1948, and The European Agreement of 1950-52). Thus, the rights of
"minors" in this area are recognized, especially when parents or other educators
abuse their authority. Moreover, the principles contained in the Charter or "Declaration of the Rights of the Child," already
cited as approved by the General Assembly
of the United Nations on November 20,
1959 (which referred to and amplified the
principles previously announced in the
Declaration of Geneva of the League of
Nations of 1929) merit new and special
mention. According to the Declaration, the
child enjoys all the human rights generically proclaimed in previous texts and,
among still others, the following:
(1) The right to a special protection and
all means necessary for his healthy
and normal development, under conditions of freedom and dignity;
(2) The right to such special treatment,
education and care as is necessary in
cases of under-privileged or underdeveloped children;
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(3)

The right to develop in an atmosphere
of affection and of moral security
and, to whatever extent possible,
under the guidance and care of his
parents;
(4) The right to a free and obligatory education, at least on the elementary
level; which education must contribute
to his general cultural growth and,
under conditions of complete equality
of opportunity, to the development
of his faculties, his personal judgment
and his sense of moral and social responsibility;
(5) The right to be protected from any
form of negligence, cruelty or exploitation;
(6) The right to be protected from any
discriminatory practices whatsoever,
and of being educated in a spirit of
understanding, tolerance and friendship among peoples.
Despite the significance of the above
"Declaration," which was approved unanimously, it must be remembered that it
ranks merely as a "recommendation." Consequently, the principles announced therein remain to be reinforced by a text binding on all nations. It is natural, therefore,
that the subject we are dealing with has
been discussed in connection with the proposed "Agreement for the Elimination of
All Forms of Religious Intolerance,"
which, as we have indicated, is currently
under consideration. The text which was
approved in principle last January, at
Geneva, provides, in its Fourth Article,
that the signatory States will respect the
primary right of parents, or those who
act on their behalf, in the selection of a
religion or beliefs for the child. However,
it also states that, when the child "has
achieved sufficient use of his reason or an

adequate level of understanding, his wishes
must be considered and, in either case, the
competent authorities must be guided in
their decisions by what is in the best interests of the child."
Epilogue
By way of recapitulation and, in a certain sense, as a basis for any legislative
enactment (and, until its promulgation, as
a decalogue of exigencies for the conscience of Christian jurists), we dare to
suggest the following conclusions:
(1) All the nations of the world must
formally recognize and guarantee the exercise of the right of religious liberty for
all men, in the spirit of the Second Vatican
Council. They must likewise guarantee the
liberty of teaching, understood in a twofold sense-the right to establish educational institutions on all grade levels (conforming, of course, to the necessary moral
and pedagogical requirements), and the
right to teach in these schools such scientific, ethical and religious disciplines as correspond to the current cultural level of the
society, the beliefs of the institution's
founders and the proper conscience of the
educators.
(2) In order that these rights be made
effective, States must eliminate from their
respective internal legislation all existing
obstacles to their exercise. Any exceptions
in this area must be carefully enumerated
as necessary, within the spirit of a democratic society, for the prevention of injury to the rights of others or to the public
morality or the common good (correctly
understood as the sum of social conditions
that make possible the fullest expansion of
the human personality).
(3) Similarly, the States must facilitate
the exercise of the twofold liberty of teach-
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ing, both institutional and academic,
through subsidizing all schools, both private and public, in accord with the principles of distributive justice and without
any discrimination whatsoever.
(4) In the relations of the State with the
family, the principle of the legitimate autonomy of the latter must prevail, with no
more intervention of the public authority
than is absolutely necessary in cases of
grave abuses on the part of the parents.
(5) The role of educating the children
pertains jointly to the father and the
mother, without any discrimination. Both
spouses must, therefore, harmonize their
views so as to avoid the harm that results
from conflicts regarding the purposes and
methods involved in the moral and religious education of the children.
(6) In case of disputes and differences
between the spouses with respect to the
education of the children, beyond those
normally involved in domestic affairs, a
moderate and reasonable intervention of
the State, in a primarily educative form,
will be permitted, subject to the principle
of subsidiarity.
(7) For the equitable solution of such
intramarital conflicts, the State will con-
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sider the "matrimonial capitulations"
agreed to by the spouses prior to the marriage, but subordinating them always to
that which appears most conducive to the
peace of the family and the well-being of
the children.
(8) Analogous norms are to be applied
in cases of conflict between the parents, on
the one hand, and the child, on the other,
concerning his religious education, attempting as much as possible to resolve such
problems from within the family circle,
without any outside interference. However,
in extraordinary cases, a path must be left
open for the peaceful intervention of the
particular State or Church involved in the
dispute.
(9) These criteria must be applied, with
any appropriate adaptation, to the educative mission of adoptive parents, tutors,
teachers and godparents, within their
respective areas of activity.
(10) Resolutions of the United Nations,
or of regional international organizations
must establish the appropriate judicial
means toward an efficacious protection of
these rights and liberties before an independent administration of justice.

